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Abstract
This research develops Code White, a hardware-implemented trusted execution
mechanism for the Symbian mobile operating system. Code White combines a signed
whitelist approach with the execution prevention technology offered by the ARM
architecture. Testing shows that it prevents all untrusted user applications from executing
while allowing all trusted applications to load and run. Performance testing in contrast
with an unmodified Symbian system shows that the difference in load time increases
linearly as the application file size increases. The predicted load time for an application
with a one megabyte code section remains well below one second, ensuring uninterrupted
experience for the user.
Smartphones have proven to be invaluable to military, civic, and business users
due in a large part to their ability to execute code just like any desktop computer can.
While many useful applications have been developed for these users, numerous malicious
programs have also surfaced. And while smartphones have desktop-like capabilities to
execute software, they do not have the same resources to scan for malware. More
efficient means, like Code White, which minimize resource usage are needed to protect
the data and capabilities found in smartphones.
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CODE WHITE: A SIGNED CODE PROTECTION MECHANISM FOR
SMARTPHONES

I. Introduction
1.1 Research Domain
Mobile phones are ubiquitous devices. Once only a means to extend the reach of
the wired phone system, the cell phone has become much more.

It carries many

additional capabilities, like sending written messages, storing personal information,
providing location and direction information, accessing web content, performing business
transactions, unlocking car doors, and changing channels on the television. The list of
features and capabilities continues to grow. While there are varying views of what
constitutes a smartphone, for this research a smartphone is a mobile phone that can
execute third party code.

1.2 Problem Statement
To the general public, mobile phones are much more than a convenient means to
communicate; they have become almost another appendage. They often hold much of the
critical information a person has. This encapsulation of information and identity is also
an essential resource in business, civic, and military operations. Since the release of the
iPhone in 2007, mobile users are now looking for one more capability in their phones: the
ability to run software programs like they can on their personal computers. Given that,
attackers have every incentive to develop malware to infect and exploit these small, ever-
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present, always-on, ready-to-execute-your-code smartphones to gain access to
information and identities and thus to the capabilities of their respective users.

1.3 Research Goals
The goal of this research is to increase smartphone security by identifying and
adapting a novel protection mechanism developed for the general purpose computing
domain for use in a smartphone. The method is tested to verify it protects the cell phone
from malware and determine whether the modified phone’s performance is acceptable
compared to the performance of an unmodified phone.
Chapter 2 discusses current literature on smartphones, their threats and
vulnerabilities, and protection methods for them.

Chapter 3 introduces the novel

protection mechanism for smartphones called Code White. Chapter 4 evaluates Code
White’s performance. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses these results as well as future areas of
research.
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II. Smartphones and Mobile Malware
This chapter provides an overview of smartphone capabilities, vulnerabilities,
threats, and protection mechanisms.

2.1 Incentives to Attack
The capabilities of modern cell phones come at the price of a host of security
vulnerabilities. Despite that, a majority of survey respondents acknowledged they would
prefer to lose their wallet than their cell phone [Glo09]. Mobile phones combine a
number of features that make them invaluable as well as extremely vulnerable. They
provide the capability to connect to the rest of the world, including friends, family, and
emergency services. They hold valuable information: personal information like contact
information, address book, current location as well as financial information like bank
account and credit card numbers to name but two categories. They are small which
makes them easy to steal or lose. They communicate via many different standards like
cellular telephony, Bluetooth and WiFi. They can be updated or even modified by their
users.

Finally, so called smartphones can run third party code that extends their

capabilities.
Cell phone attacks have been possible since the introduction of cell phones. They
began with simple denial of service attacks, including RF jamming. With the advent of
messaging capabilities, additional vulnerabilities arose. Each phone sent to market has its
own code for handling incoming messages. Attackers use specially-crafted messages to
exploit vulnerabilities in this code to disable the phone or accomplish some other goal.
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But the greatest leap in malicious potential is the ability to run custom applications.
Where previous attacks were constrained to conform to a particular vector (like SMS
message size limitations [Rob03]), attacks now can be written into programs and
downloaded for direct execution. A hacker must still defeat any code protections on the
device, but the scope of possibilities available is much greater. Hackers need only access
a mobile OS’ API and the functionality it provides.
Another incentive for malware development on mobile devices is through
premium services via the Short Messaging Service (SMS). By sending a message to a
specific number (usually shorter than a standard number), the account of the sending
phone is charged a fee for each message sent. A criminal can lease a short number and
release malware that causes infected phones to send periodic messages to the number in
question, unbeknownst to their owners.

Since many premium fee services are

international and the perpetrator can collect payment from the number provider before
their victims receive billing statements, this crime is very difficult to prosecute. [Gos09]
There are a number of ways to prevent messages from being sent; including having the
user acknowledge each message, but such measures can be subverted. For example, a
message promising a pornographic image if the user selects “yes” to show that they are
18 or older.

2.2 Threats
The unique nature and vulnerabilities of smartphones make them a prime target
for malware. This section discusses the goals, methods, and features of smartphonetargeting malware.
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The first known mobile malware was the Cabir worm, developed as a proof of
concept in 2004 by the hacker group 29A [Gos09]. It contained no malicious payload,
only the ability to replicate itself and propagate via Bluetooth on Symbian phones. Since
2004, mobile malware development has branched out to different platforms with different
goals. It is beneficial to create a taxonomy of attacks and thereby classify the many
variations of malicious code found in the wild. The following sections discuss various
criteria for categorizing different types of malware. The resultant taxonomy is shown in
Table 1.
Table 1 - A Taxonomy of Mobile Malware
Attack

Example Types
Phone
Target
Network Servers
Application Layer
Protocol Layer
Network Layer
SMS/MMS
Bluetooth
Propagation Method Wifi
Removable Media
Email
Monetary Gain
DoS
Goal
Spying
Symbian
iOS
Win Mobile
OS/Platform
Android
Java
Polymorphism
Polymorphic Code

Example Attacks
Theft, Phone Malware, Jamming
Server Malware
Mobile Malware
Malformed Messages
Trojan-SMS.J2ME
Cabir Worm
Ikee
Infojack
FakePlayer
FakePlayer
Appdisabler
InfoJack
Viver, Yxe
Ikee
Cxover
Fakeplayer
Trojan-SMS.J2ME
Pmcryptic.A

2.2.1 Attacks Defined by Target or Protocol
The first category of malware is based on the attack target within the mobile
network (i.e., call center, mobile phone, base station). Another distinguishes between
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attacks based on the protocol layer targeted (i.e., jamming on the physical layer,
spoofing).

This includes attacks against the mobile device itself as well as the

applications running on it. [Guo07]
2.2.2 Attacks Defined by Propagation method
Another category focuses on propagation methods. Modern phones communicate
via a variety of media and standards beginning with the mobile networks themselves.
The category for these networks is further extensible to include communication type:
Short Message Service (SMS), Multimedia Messaging Services (MMS), and data
services (internet connectivity) to name a few. Many phones also have the capability to
access WiFi or WiMax networks for additional data services. For shorter transmissions,
(normally to peer phones or peripherals) many include native Bluetooth capabilities.
Most also connect to and synchronize with personal computers, typically via USB or
infrared interfaces.

Finally, removable storage and peripherals provides an avenue

through which malware may enter. From the messaging system to memory cards to
Common Access Cards, there are many ways to reach victim phones. [Che07]
Bluetooth is a ready attack vector as many users leave it enabled on their phone in
a discoverable mode which is precisely how the first virus written for smartphones was
propagated. In 2005, the Cabir worm made news when an outbreak was discovered at the
World Athletic Championships in Helsinki, Finland. No damage was done to the victim
phones, but the dozens of infections at a single event opened the eyes of users and
developers around the globe. [Ley05]
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With an increase in text and multimedia messaging, SMS and MMS grow in
popularity as methods for malware transmission. Figure 1 shows the growth of SMS
messaging in the United States. In addition to Bluetooth, the Mabir variant of the Cabir
worm uses MMS to propagate. Upon receipt of any SMS or MMS message, an infected
phone replies via MMS with a message that contains only the installation file for the
worm. If the user thinks it is a reply to their recent message and opens the file, the worm
is installed in an autostart mode [Wor09].

Figure 1 - SMS Text Messages Sent Monthly in USA in Billions (Wikipedia)

The InfoJack trojan is an example of malware that propagates via memory cards.
Its creator packed it with legitimate executable files to encourage distribution. Once
executed on a WinCE phone, the trojan installs itself and makes modifications to the
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operating system, including one that allows further installations without prompting the
user. It also copies itself to any attached media cards and sets itself as an autorun file. If
another user subsequently puts the media card into another WinCE phone, the process
repeats. InfoJack attempts to contact its host website, upload information from the phone
and download any updates. The website has since been taken down [Sha08][Gos09].
2.2.3 Attacks Defined by Goal
Another way to differentiate malware is by their attack goal. Malware has many
objectives, but a leading one is theft. This can be direct monetary theft as discussed
above for premium numbers or information theft which can indirectly be used for
monetary gain. A virus can steal and destroy data from phones, run up bills by making
calls to premium-rate numbers, record conversations where personal data and credit card
numbers are exchanged, and even get a phone camera to spy on its owner and transmit
photos [Bie05]. Other attack types include Denial of Service (direct or indirect via
battery drain), hijacking, and others. These attacks can all be aligned with the three
essential elements of computer security: confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA).
Information theft attacks breach confidentiality, hijacking breaks integrity, and DoS
attacks impede availability [Dag04].
In addition to analyzing the goal of the malware, the targeting methods can also
be a basis for categorization. Some malware is packaged with a specific pre-determined
target. Others choose targets from infected hosts by sending copies of themselves to
contacts listed in a victim’s phone. Others choose targets randomly, propagating to
devices at randomly generated numbers or addresses [Che07].
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The Multidropper Trojan infects Symbian phones and installs a number of other
programs on each device. One is the Kiazha Trojan which creates an account for the
victim user on a remote server. It forwards the victim’s messages and personal data to
the server and deletes them from the phone. It then displays a message to the user
demanding payment for the return of the stolen data [Tro08].

This is an example of

malware created with the end goal of monetary gain.
Malware with a different goal is the Kblock Trojan. After being installed it locks
the keypad. To clear the malware requires the phone to be reset to its factory default state
which deletes all personal information [Sym09].

Global Smartphone Sales by Operating System Q2
2009
Windows
9%

Other
6%

Android
2% Blackberry
19%

iphone
13%

Symbian
51%

Figure 2 - Global Smartphone Sales by OS Q2 2009 (Source: Gartner)

2.2.4 Other Characteristics
Other useful distinctions between malware can be made as well. Examining the
market share of the various mobile operating systems provides insight into the trends in
Smartphone threats. Figure 2 shows Q2 2009 sales data for Smartphones around the
9

world by operating system. Notably, the Symbian OS has sold more phones than all the
others combined.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of mobile malware families by the operating
systems they target. Symbian OS is the clear leader due to its large market presence
which supports the correlation between malware targeting and targeted platform
distribution. The Symbian OS has more threats than any other because of its wider
distribution. Likewise, Java viruses are more prevalent since the Java Micro Edition
(J2ME) provides a platform for a virus to run on many systems without being
individually rewritten.

Mobile Malware Families by
Operating System
3

31

3
Symbian
J2ME
Python
Windows
Sgold

7

62

Figure 3 - Malware by Operating System [Gos09]

To date, relatively little malware has targeted iPhone OS, Google’s Android, or
Blackberry OS. Possible reasons include market share, length of time on the market
(Android 1.0 was released in Oct 2008), capability of writing malware for platforms that
run on top of those platforms, and the security features implemented to prevent malware.
10

The latter two are discussed in more detail later in this chapter. No doubt, more malware
for these phones will emerge in time.
Another distinguishing feature of mobile malware is polymorphism (i.e., code that
modifies itself each time it makes a copy to avoid detection). One polymorphic mobile
worm is Pmcryptic.A which infects WinCE phones. It runs a variety of payloads from
meaningless popups to dialing premium numbers to file deletion.

In addition, it

replicates itself multiple times on the device, including on each removable storage device
it finds. Each replication is appended with up to 255 bytes of random data. This weak
form of polymorphism makes it more difficult to detect by scanning [Fer08]. While only
a few mobile viruses employ polymorphism, more are expected as mobile malware
matures.

2.3 Current Research on Mobile Phone Protections
Given the potential damages discussed above and the ramifications to users, many
options to protect Smartphones and the data they contain are being explored. This
section discusses a number of protection strategies and detection mechanisms aimed at
securing Smartphones from misuse.
2.3.1 Antivirus and Mobile Phones
Before discussing mobile security, it is helpful to review popular protection
measures from the realm of general purpose computing and evaluate those measures from
the standpoint of mobile computing. A protection many consider most analogous to
computer security is the use of antivirus (AV) software.
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AV software is a brute force approach to security. The software scans all files on
an information system for the presence of malware, and repeats the process often. The
frequency of scanning can be adjusted, but typically are daily or weekly.
Consider the differences between phones and desktop computers. Rather than a
multi-gigahertz processor, a top of the line CPU in a phone runs a few hundred
megahertz. In place of virtually limitless power from a wall socket, batteries supply a
phone with the majority of its power. There are similar limitations in other resources
which make AV unattractive for mobile use. Though phones generally have significantly
fewer files than a typical PC and have the recently added capability to multitask, they
cannot provide the expected performance in their primary services (calling, messaging,
etc) and run an AV profile like that used on a desktop. Additionally, an AV program on a
phone is not as effective as one running on a desktop since its effectiveness is based on
the currency of its signature.

Depending on factors such as range, reception, and

roaming, the delivery of these files may not be timely for a given phone.
Though antivirus is not a good solution for mobile devices, there is still a need for
host-based protection [Mie06]. Cellular networks provide some protections external to
the mobile device, but they are no replacement for security measures on the device itself.
The following protections are currently being used or are being investigated as a way to
protect mobile phones and the data they process.
2.3.2 Application Protection
Third party applications pose one of the greatest risks to the smartphone. Some
are poorly written and introduce security holes and instability to the system. Others are
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malicious. Many methods protect the smartphone from errant application activity. Table
2 shows two of the most popular application protection measures as implemented by five
of the top mobile operating systems: sandboxing and signing.
Table 2 - Security Features of Mobile Operating Systems
OS
Android
Blackberry
iPhone OS

Symbian
Windows

Sandboxing
All applications run in JVM
All applications run in JVM except
included core apps
Native installation, sandboxed via file
permissions, memory space, etc.
[The10]
Not required. Apps can be native or
run on Java, etc
Not required. Apps can be native or
run on Java, etc

Signing
All must be signed by author [Sig10]
All (signing authority based on
capabilities) [Sch09]
All

All (signing authority
capabilities)
Yes, but user can override

based

on

2.3.2.1 Sandboxing
Sandboxing, or virtualization, implements a computing environment within
another computing environment. The virtual machine provides resources and acts as if it
were running directly on hardware though it is fully contained by the host system. In the
case of a guest system crash, the host maintains its stability, and merely terminates the
guest environment process. Additionally, the host prevents the guest from accessing
critical files and data on the host system. A phone may also have multiple virtualization
layers implemented.

This allows a user to use their phone for multiple roles (like

personal and business use) and may allow some applications to only access data or
resources for a single role [Kro09].
Five of the top mobile operating systems sandboxing implementations are shown
in Table 2. Android and Blackberry require all third party applications to execute within
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a Java virtual machine. The iPhone OS installs all applications natively, but sandboxes
them via virtual memory techniques and file protection measures. Finally, Symbian and
Windows do not require sandboxing, though it is supported through Java and others.
2.3.2.2 Application Signing
Application signing affixes a unique signature to executable code for
identification purposes.

The signature can serve a number of purposes including

validating the code integrity and providing an audit trail back to the original author.
There are various signature types, but most current implementations use cryptographic
public keys issued by a certification authority (CA). The CA issues the requesting party a
unique public and private key pair. One key will identify the other, but cannot easily be
deduced by having the other. The keys are used to sign the files in the following fashion:
the signing authority computes a one way hash of the file. The signer’s private key is
used to encrypt the hash and any other desired information but generally not the code
itself for efficiency reasons. The output is the actual signature. The signature is included
in the executable file itself.
All major mobile OSes require some form of application signing. Usually they
require that developers obtain and use a unique signature for identification purposes.
However, some (Blackberry for instance) require that if an application makes use of
certain critical APIs, the app must be vetted and signed by the OS’ own authority. As for
application installation, most OSes reject unsigned or malsigned applications. Windows
however, allows installation if the user overrides the onscreen warning.
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Application signing is not completely effective.

Malware authors have

successfully signed their wares before. The Yxe, Album, CommDN, and NMPlugin
worms are all examples of malware that has been signed by Symbian. Malware authors
take advantage of inexpensive signing fees, low audit rates, and an emphasis on stability
over security in the application process to have their wares signed. [Jar07][Apv10].
Akin to application signing is application certification, which is is based on the
capabilities of a prospective application as opposed to its signature. Many mobile OS’
require applications to identify what system capabilities they require access to at signing
time (like Symbian Signed). Kirin, a proof-of-concept certification method implements
an application installer which checks all application capabilities at install time and looks
for potentially dangerous capability combinations (for instance, an application that can
start on boot, read geographic location and access the Internet could be a malicious
tracker). Resource consumption is small, since this service is only invoked at install time
[Enc09].
2.3.3 Anomaly Detection
One method used to decrease risk is to use observable behavior from the phone to
determine if its activity is questionable. Within this category of protection, there are two
variations: anomaly detection and misuse detection.

Anomaly detection defines a

“normal” profile for a system and looks for discrepancies; misuse detection uses rules to
designate states as “good” or “bad”.
A common consideration for anomaly and misuse detection is determining the
best place to perform the detection. If detection and analysis are performed on the mobile
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device, the system has the same disadvantage as a standard antivirus program – excessive
resource use. Much of the research in this area mitigates these limitations by using a
hybrid host-based and network-based solution. This combines the more ample resources
of the network with the granularity of host-based reporting. In general, each mobile
device is programmed with an agent that sends small reports on activities and
characteristics such as resource usage and communications sessions.

Table 3 lists

examples of potential indicators available in these reports which are periodically
forwarded to a server on the network. The server analyzes not only the individual device
reports it receives, but backbone-provided data and trends as well.

In most

implementations, the server contacts devices as necessary, passing instructions to protect
them from attack (like blacklisting infected phones [Che07][Sch091].
Table 3 - Example Reportable Features of a Mobile Device

Data Category
Computing Resources
Operating Entities
Communication Channels
Messaging Statistics
User Information
Other Hardware

Example Data
CPU utilization, RAM utilization
Process count, Thread count
Bluetooth Connections, TX status
SMS/MMS messages sent
User activity length, inactivity length
Battery charge

The benefits of outsourcing the analysis from the devices themselves includes
saving battery power and achieving a broader view than any one device itself is capable
of via a proxy.
While useful in minimizing damage caused by mobile malware, these methods are
not proactive. Detection can only occur after an infection or misuse has already occurred.
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These methods try to limit continued misuse and the infection of other phones but cannot
prevent the infection itself. One system requires ~20% of all phones to be infected before
detection and mitigation [Che07].
2.3.4 Other Methods
Three other types of protection have been proposed [Guo07]. They suggest a
reduction in the attackable “surface” of the phone, an example of which is turning off the
non-signaling computing functions when not actively used. Second, they recommend
hardening the OS itself which includes incorporating measures that ensure user
notification when changes are made to the phone. Third, they advocate hardening the
device hardware, specifically suggesting the use of Trusted Platform Modules to protect
device configuration and data. Graphical Turing Tests have also been proposed which
distinguish between human and computer response by the ability to solve a visual puzzle
[Xie09]. These puzzles specifically protect the phone’s messaging capability and so
detect and prevent the spread of malware.
2.3.5 SecureQEMU
The security features above add a measure of security to the systems they protect.
However, they have a significant undesirable characteristic, they are reactive in the case
of anomaly detection, or they require user interaction like the Graphical Turing Test.
They mitigate malicious activity once it is observed and identified but the underlying
problem is the identification of malware itself, which may require human interaction to
make the determination. The anomaly detection method falls short because it is blacklist
driven - it requires that an activity match undesired characteristics, and those
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characteristics must be defined a priori.

The Turing Test requires no knowledge

beforehand, but involves its user in all decisions.
SecureQEMU does not have these limitations. It is implemented in the emulation
layer and requires that all code be signed at the page level and checked against a whitelist
of known good code, resulting in a closed system by default. Pages that match known
good signatures are allowed to execute while those that do not are ignored, with no user
interaction required [Kim09].
SecureQEMU is implemented in an emulated Windows/Intel desktop system
making use of the no-execute bit in the memory paging system. The no-execute bits are
originally set to zero, and the exception handler is hooked so that a no-execute exception
computes a hash of the page and compares it to the whitelist. If a match is found, the bit
is set and the page is allowed to execute.

2.4 Summary
This chapter reviews the vulnerabilities of and threats to smartphones, as well as a
number of protection mechanisms that are either already in use or are proposed for
protecting them. It examines the various protection mechanisms’ efficacy and the costs
they incur.

The following chapter provides a methodology for implementing a

mechanism similar to SecureQEMU’s signed code method in a mobile device.
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III. Code White
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents Code White (Code Whitelist and Hardware Implemented
Trusted Execution,) a signed code adaptation of the Symbian OS running on an ARM
processor. It enforces a code whitelist by means of the execution bit available in many
newer mobile processors. It operates in kernel mode and effectively protects the system
from malicious user-mode code.
Running signed code provides two benefits over unsigned code. First, it verifies
the author or sender of the code, and it ensures that the code has not changed since it was
installed on the device. These two benefits are known as non-reputability and integrity in
the CIA security model.
This chapter first describes the salient features of the ARM architecture and
Symbian Operating System that make them suitable for this research. A full discussion
of the design and implementation of Code White follows. Much of Section 3.3 is adapted
from [Sal06].

3.2 The ARM Architecture
The ARM Architecture (ACORN RISC Machine or Advanced RISC Machine) is
a reduced instruction set computer (RISC) architecture that first saw production in 1983.
Originally designed for desktop computing, ARM has evolved to be the embedded
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architecture of choice in many areas, especially in mobile phones. Nearly 98% of mobile
phones worldwide contain at least one ARM processor [Kra06].
Being a RISC architecture, simplicity is ARMs hallmark. This promotes ease of
implementation and lowers power consumption which is extremely desirable in the
embedded world. Additional RISC features include: load/store processing, numerous
uniform access registers, and a fixed-length instruction. ARM supports seven processor
modes: one user mode and six privileged modes. The Supervisor privileged mode is
reserved for protected operating system processing [Kna04].
The ARM architecture is actually a family of architectures that spans 26 versions
in 14 families. Each version/family extends the capabilities of previous implementations.
Version six (ARMv6) in the ARM11 family has notable changes over ARMv5, including
the addition of the execute-never (XN) bit to the page table permissions. The OS can set
this bit in the page table entries for pages that do not contain executable code. Any
attempt to fetch an instruction from such a page results in a permission fault [ARM05].
Many smartphones today use Cortex-A8 based processors from the ARMv7 architecture
which inherits the XN bit from ARMv6.

3.3 The Symbian Operating System
The Symbian Operating System was designed specifically for mobile computing.
Its origin traces back to an 8-bit kernel developed in the 1980s for use in personal
organizers and extends to the current 32-bit kernel, EKA2. Throughout that progression,
Symbian remains an embedded OS, similar to other real time OSes, but also now includes
functionality that was once only found in larger desktop systems. This makes it an ideal
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platform for smartphones since its real time capabilities support the signaling protocols
for voice and data transmission while additional functionality marshals processes and
applications in a secure manner.
Symbian’s kernel, EKA2, is modular, a feature that permeates the rest of the OS
as well. This modularity keeps Symbian’s many functional areas streamlined and simple.
Built for a single user (most mobile devices are not designed for multiple users), it has a
preemptive multi-tasking kernel, allowing multiple applications to run, while ensuring
that each application releases the CPU as required. It is also priority based, quickly
allocating resources from lower priority threads for use by higher priority threads.
To keep the kernel as small as possible, a number of services often found within
the kernel are implemented using user mode servers, including all file and windowing
services. A partial overview of Symbian is shown in Figure 4 (adapted from [Sal06]).

EWSRV

EFILE

(window server)

(file server)

EUSER
privilege
boundary

(user library)

user
kernel

EKERN
(kernel)

physical
boundary

software
hardware

memory
model

MMU

CPU

Figure 4 - An Overview of the Symbian Operating System
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3.3.1 Memory Management
Symbian OS supports many kinds of devices and their associated hardware
architectures.

Its memory management component supports five different models.

Understanding these models is important.
The Memory Management Unit (MMU) translates between physical and virtual
addresses. The MMU (or lack thereof) is the leading characteristic that defines the
memory model used. A list of memory models is shown in Table 4.
Before discussing the models themselves, it is important to define chunks and
paging. A “chunk” is the primary unit of allocation, mapping physical RAM and other
devices to contiguous virtual addresses. A chunk includes a reserved region (the set of
virtual addresses available to the process) and a committed region (the physical mapped
region of RAM). The kernel allocates chunks and may alter their size dynamically. Each
process is allocated at least two chunks: one to hold the executable’s .data section
(initialized gobal and writable static data), .bss section (zero filled data) and user-side
stack space, the other to hold the main thread heap. If the executable is not loaded from
ROM, the MMU allocates a third chunk for the code.
All memory models except the direct model use paged memory where processes
are allocated linear, virtual memory addresses that translate to physical addresses on the
RAM chip itself. Demand paging (i.e., swapping pages between memory and other
storage for performance reasons) is not currently supported.
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Table 4 - Symbian Memory Models and Their Characteristics
No MMU

Direct Memory Model

Virtually tagged cache

Moving Memory Model

Physically tagged cache

Multiple Memory Model

Emulator

Emulator Memory Model

Supports Symmetric Multi-Processor

Flexible Memory Model

3.3.1.1 The Moving Memory Model
The moving memory model was the most common model until the advent of the
ARMv6 architecture. It is based on the use of a single page table directory for the entire
OS and all processes. Processes share the virtual address space, and are accessed by
moving memory chunks during context switches (i.e., changing their virtual addresses).
For security, the moving model makes use of page table permissions and domains.
Page table permissions record the allowed access from user and supervisor modes
(read/write/execute). Domains (up to 16 in ARMv5) provide a fast way to modify
memory page rights. Each page is assigned to exactly one domain. The domain dictates
whether that page is not accessible, accessible to all (ignoring table permissions), or
accessible according to page permissions.
Context switches in the moving model are slow and complex. The MMU changes
the page directory entry for the outgoing and incoming processes, along with the
necessary domain entries and permission bits. The translation look-aside buffer (TLB)
and cache are cleared to prevent false hits (as the old and new process were mapped to
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the same virtual addresses). The moving model uses an indexed and tagged virtual
addresses cache.
3.3.1.2 The Multiple Memory Model
The multiple memory model makes improvements in performance and security.
First, it uses two page directories as opposed to one in the moving model. One is global,
and another is specific to the local process. For security it adds the no-execute bit to page
table entries while maintaining the permissions and domains concepts from the moving
model (though the use of domains has been deprecated). This ensures that data pages are
never read during instruction fetching, no matter what the other permissions are.
Processes receive an application space identifier (ASID) which is prepended to virtual
addresses belonging to the process in structures like the TLB, thereby eliminating the
need for flushing buffers during context switches. Finally, the cache is virtually indexed
and physically tagged, which means that the cache does not require flushing between
context switches either as memory references will always resolve to a single process.
The multiple model’s name is due to keeping multiple processes mapped to
memory simultaneously. Context switches are much quicker than the moving model
since they involve a change to only two registers: the register that holds the page
directory and the context id register.
3.3.1.3 The Direct Memory Model
This model disables the MMU so the OS is limited to direct mapping between
virtual and physical addresses. Without an MMU, the memory must be divided among
processes at build time since chunks cannot change at run time. Furthermore, there is no

24

protection between kernel space and user space. For these reasons, Symbian does not
support this mode for production devices.

It is useful for porting software: a

manufacturer may disable the MMU to simplify the debugging of other functions. Once
they are stable, the MMU is re-enabled and a different memory model is used.
3.3.1.4 The Emulator Memory Model
The Emulator Model is based on a PC running Windows. This model does not
interact directly with hardware to allocate memory, but interacts with the host OS via the
host’s APIs. It is only used to operate the WINS emulator for Symbian, not the QEMU
emulator.

The latter emulates actual ARM hardware on which any of the other

compatible memory models may be used.
3.3.1.5 The Flexible Memory Model
The Flexible Memory Model is the newest model, supporting the ARMv7 and
later families. It builds upon the Multiple Model, but adds support for the Symbian
Symmetric Multiprocessor (SMP) kernel for multicore CPUs beginning with the ARM
Cortex A9. At the time of this writing, documentation on this mode is limited, but
departures from the Multiple Model include: 1) arrays of physical page addresses which
represent storage for chunks, code, and thread stacks that replace chunks as the basic
allocation entity called “memory objects”. 2) Permissions and sharing properties apply to
“memory mappings” rather than the chunk. One or more memory mappings may apply
to one or more memory objects. 3) Processes sharing the same chunk may use different
virtual addresses for access.
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3.3.2 Security
Symbian security is built around the following three elements: the OS process is
the unit of trust, capabilities control access to sensitive resources, and data caging
protects files against unauthorized access.
3.3.2.1 Processes and Trust
There are three levels of trust within Symbian. The most trusted level is the
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) which consists of the kernel, the file server, and the
installer. This level is the source of all trust for the rest of the OS. It has unrestricted
access to resources and has the most protection applied. Next is the Trusted Computing
Environment (TCE). These modules need access to some but not all critical resources
and are responsible for protecting those resources. Finally, the application layer is for
processes that are not trusted to access resources directly, but which must request service
via the other two levels.
Additional process protections extend beyond the basic levels of privilege above.
First, privileged threads/processes like the kernel that need to access unprivileged user
mode memory do so via special methods that ensure the stability of the process if invalid
memory is accessed. Next, all thread memory spaces are considered private; they cannot
be accessed by other processes. Additionally, new thread stacks and heaps are zeroed in
memory to eliminate the chance of data leaking from an old process to a new one. The
never-execute bit prevents execution of memory contents in stacks, heaps, and static data
to prevent malicious code execution.
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3.3.2.2 The Capability Model
Capabilities in Symbian are authorization tokens. They protect data resources by
ensuring only those processes that have been approved to access them can do so. The
first rule of this model is that a process’ list of capabilities never changes during its
lifetime. Capabilities are specified at compile time and cannot be modified thereafter.
Second, no process can load a library with fewer capabilities than itself since a call to the
loading library would then execute its code with the process’ greater privilege.
3.3.2.3 Data Caging
Symbian’s file access control system is based on directory paths. Under any
drive, there are four directories under the root that denote differing access levels. Files in
the \sys directory are only accessible by the TCB. These are files critical to the system:
executables for example. Second, files in the \resource directory are readable by all
processes, but only writeable by the TCB. These are fairly static files like images and
help files. Next is the \private directory which has subdirectories for every process. Only
that process and the TCB can access this directory. Any other directory under the root is
considered public and has no restrictions.
3.3.3 Enhancing Symbian
Symbian OS is the platform used to implement Code White. It is open source,
represents a large portion of the smartphone community, and supports the ARM
processor and its associated execution bit.
Symbian already has a signing protection, so why enhance it? As discussed in
Chapter 2, the signing process has been manipulated by malicious coders. Furthermore,
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Symbian Signed certificates only provide non-repudiation. Code White adds the XN bit
to prevent untrusted code from executing and moves this from user to kernel mode
enhancing its integrity.

3.4 Design
Chapter 2 explains the need and difficulty of achieving trusted execution in
mobile devices. Mobile device manufacturers and network operators use a variety of
methods to achieve such trust, even while running third party code. Even so, application
signing has been subverted as malicious code writers also have certificates. Code White
provides an alternative signed code execution method. It extends the Symbian OS loader
to include an additional assurance that only trusted code may execute on the device by
combining two protection mechanisms: a whitelist for executable code and execution
permission bits in the page tables.
3.4.1 Signed Code Execution
The first Code White mechanism is a whitelist for executable code. Chapter 2
discusses many types of malware for mobile devices. Though diverse, they share one
trait in common, they need to execute code on target devices. Using a signed code
mechanism places code into two groups, trusted and untrusted. This is different than a
blacklist. A blacklist explicitly identifies known malicious code and allows all of the rest
to execute. This is a ‘fail open’ system as the default case allows the unknown code
access to the system, and fails to adhere to the design principle of fail-safe defaults
[Sal75]. A whitelist identifies trusted code disallowing all others, resulting in a ‘fail
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closed’ system. In this case, whether unknown code is malicious or not is unimportant, it
cannot execute unless it is known and trustworthy.
3.4.1.1 Cryptographic Support
An important issue in a whitelist system is how to identify trusted code. The
system could store copies of all allowable code and compare an arriving executable, but
this is highly inefficient, even pointless since having copies of trusted code on the device
would eliminate the need to bring them on the device in the first place. It is necessary to
protect code with a smaller object that is unique, and cannot be easily counterfeited.
Code White uses a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) to uniquely
identify trusted code. Computing a cryptographic hash is a one-way function that takes
data of arbitrary length and produces a ‘digest’ of that data.

An HMAC is a

cryptographic hash of both the message and a secret key. The reasons for using an
HMAC are twofold. First, using a hash digest makes it infeasible for an attacker to pass
malicious code into the system since a hash function is a one-way function. It is easy to
compute a hash from a message, but impossible to compute a message from a hash. An
attacker that knows the trusted digests is still unable to construct malicious code that
results in the same digest as one on the list. Second, by using the HMAC, each hash list
is unique to its user since the HMAC of each message/key pair is different than that of
other users. Thus, even if an attacker were able to produce a malicious file that had a
trusted HMAC, it would only be for one user. Trying to produce such a file only for one
user is very inefficient.
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3.4.1.2 Kernel Layer Implementation Protects User Layer
Code White protects a smartphone from untrusted user applications, including
.exe files and statically linked libraries (.dll). Since it protects at the user level, it is
necessary that the mechanism itself execute from the kernel level so that user code cannot
affect or interfere with its performance.
Modifications to the Symbian OS that make up Code White are all within the
kernel and the file server which are both part of the Trusted Computing Base. It is
essential to have this mechanism which raises trust execute from the most trusted parts of
the OS.
3.4.1.3 Trusting the List
The list of trusted HMACs is intended to be open. However, the HMAC of the
list itself is computed at compile time for the kernel and included in the kernel binary file
so the list can be validated before use. An attacker could modify the list, but then the list
HMAC computed at run time would not match the original and the protection mechanism
defaults to the closed state.
3.4.2 Hardware Assisted Execution Prevention
Computing a cryptographic digest and checking it against a whitelist provides the
system with the necessary information to determine trustworthiness, but does nothing to
enforce the decision made. Code White loads all code into memory but modifies the
permissions of the code’s page tables such that only trusted code has the bit set that
allows execution. Untrusted code loaded into memory has the no execute bit set for its
page tables. When the instructions are fetched from an untrusted page, a prefetch abort is
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raised and the appropriate actions can be taken to notify the user, isolate, monitor or
report on the code in question.

3.5 Implementation
3.5.1 The Symbian Loading Process
In a standard Symbian loading process the loader operates like a server, and has
portions that execute in user mode and others in kernel mode. The loading process
begins when invoked by user mode functions to run executable files. An executable can
be an executable application (.exe), library (.dll), driver (.ldd or .pdd), file system/system
extension/system plugin or locale (all except .exe are types of dlls).

The term

‘executable’ means any one of these file types and application denotes an .exe file only.
A TRomImage is an executable that resides in the device ROM. All symbols,
relocation data and import data are discarded and the import stubs are replaced with the
actual exported function addresses in ROM. They are not compressed. This enables the
TRomImage to execute in-place (designated as XIP). When executing a TRomImage, the
kernel allocates data and heap chunks to their processes, but the code itself executes
directly from the ROM. E32Images cannot reside in ROM. If an E32Image is sent to the
ROM building process, it is converted to a TRomImage. These two file types have
different headers, the TRomImageHeader and E32ImageHeader.
The application loading process has six main phases, each stemming from a main
function found in E32Image::LoadProcess. These are:
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-

RImageFinder::Search
E32Image::Construct
E32Loader::ProcessCreate
E32Image::LoadToRam
E32Image::ProcessImports
E32Loader::ProcessLoaded

(E32Loader functions are kernel executive functions, while the others all execute
in user mode.)
The following paragraphs describe the loading process for a non-execute-in-place
application. RImageFinder::Search begins by finding the requested file for execution. If
a complete path is not specified, it searches for any sys/bin (the required location for
executable files per Symbian platform security) at each drive letter starting with Y and
moving back to A, and lastly Z which is the drive letter for the device ROM image.
Understanding this search is important since multiple executables may be on the device.
The search function runs the first one that matches the requested filename. Thus an
E32Image test.exe found on the S: drive would execute rather than one that was included
in ROM unless the user requests the full path to it: Z:\sys\bin\test.exe.
The search function performs a number of activities upon finding the intended
file. It collects basic information about the file and performs some sanity checking for
platform security reasons. Included in the code is a sub-function to compute a hash of the
file, but according to a comment in the source, the function is bypassed for performance
reasons.
E32Image::Construct reads the entire E32ImageHeader and populates member
variables with the header information. E32Image extends the TProcessCreateInfo which
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extends TCodeSegCreateInfo. The latter two are used extensively throughout the rest of
the loading process.
E32Loader::ProcessCreate creates the new process object. It allocates a memory
address, maps RAM for the code and then creates the data/bss/stack chunk. It adds the
process to the kernel’s process list and creates the main thread.
E32Image::LoadToRam then reads the code and data sections into their respective
memory locations. The code is loaded into the loader’s address space while the data is
loaded into the new process’ space. If the file is compressed by the deflate or byte pair
algorithms, it is decompressed here.

Once the code is loaded, LoadToRam calls a

number of sub-functions to relocate the code.
E32Image::ProcessImports searches the file’s import directory and loads each dll
found there. RImageFinder::Search, E32Image::Construct, E32Image::LoadToRam, and
E32Image::ProcessImports are invoked again for each dll, just as for an .exe. The
difference is that the E32Loader functions ProcessCreate and ProcessLoaded are replaced
by calls by subfunction calls CodeSegCreate and CodeSegLoaded.

This occurs

recursively for each .dll. Any imports that they include are loaded and checked for
additional imports.
Finally, the E32Loader::ProcessLoaded function creates a new code chunk in the
the new process’ address space and remaps the code from the loader’s address space.
The loader sets the main thread state to ‘ready’ and returns.
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3.5.2 Reading the Code Section
Figure 5 illustrates Code White’s execution and shows where each part is located
in the Symbian loading process. The three basic sections of Code White are reading the
code, computing the HMAC, and setting the XN bit as necessary.
Access to the loading code section is the first objective of the signed code
protection mechanism. Code White interacts with the Symbian loading process during
the E32Image::LoadToRam stage within the E32Image::Read function as shown in
Figure 5. The code and data sections are read into the memory allocated at their specified
load addresses. The modified function allocates a buffer on the loader’s user heap and
reads a second copy of the code into the buffer.
The next step is reading the hmacs.txt file in s:\sys\bin. The full file path is
specified to eliminate the need to search for it. The loader opens this file, checks its size,
allocates a sufficient buffer on the user heap, and reads in the file contents.
A TCodeInfo object is created with a class unique to Code White. Four member
variables are initialized, one for each buffer’s size and one for each address.

The

function then calls E32Loader::CodeCheck, a kernel executive function created solely for
Code White.
3.5.3 Computing the HMAC
The CodeCheck executive moves execution to kernel mode, in keeping with the
desired kernel layer protection characteristic of Code White.

As all other loader

executive calls, CodeCheck performs a security check to validate it was called by the
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loader thread. Any other system entity fails this check, at which point the server is
panicked and the kernel ends the loading process.

Figure 5 - Code White Modifications to the Symbian Loading Process

After some argument marshalling, the loader creates two buffers on the kernel
heap, one for the HMACs file and one for the loading code section. It copies information
from the user heap to the kernel heap using the kumemget function which allows the
kernel to access user memory.
The function computes the HMACs of each of the new buffers using the MD5
algorithm.

The

key

used

is

a

hard

coded

32

byte

string

“123456789012345678901234567890AB” but in an actual system, the key is unique to
the user, for instance a PKI private key. The hashing function returns a 20 byte HMAC
for each buffer. It compares the HMACs file HMAC to determine if it is an exact match,
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and searches the HMACs file buffer to see if the code section HMAC exists within the
buffer. The HMACs file is not sorted and there is no special algorithm for searching for a
match, but this could optimize performance. There is no particular encoding for the
HMACs file. It holds only the HMACs in their binary forms, separated by 16 bits of ‘0’s.
The results of the HMAC comparisons are recorded in a global variable:
iAllowExecution. Another global variable iAlreadySet ensures that loading dependencies
of varying trust levels in a particular order will not compromise protection effectiveness.
All required dlls are loaded during the main executable’s loading process, which means
both of these integer ‘flags’ are needed to correctly ensure that all code used by the new
process is trusted. Both flags are cleared to 0 during the E32Loader::LoadProcess stage
following the creation of the process object and declaration of a process ID. This
initialization takes place before the main executable’s code is loaded into memory. All
dll code is read into memory after the main executable before CodeCheck is ever called.
Since the system allows at most one instance of the loader which can only load one
process at a time, there are never conflicts when accessing these global flags.
Table 5 shows the truth table for the decision process in the CodeCheck function.
The AlreadySet flag is set during the code check for the new process’ main executable,
and is never cleared. The AllowExecution flag can only transition from 1 to 0 if the
AlreadySet flag is 0 (i.e., this is the first executable to load for this process) and both the
HMACs file and the loading image code are trusted.

If it is ever cleared in the

CodeCheck function, subsequent calls to this function will not set it again. Once these
variables are properly set, the CodeCheck function returns.
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Table 5 - Truth Table for iAllowExecution and iAlreadySet
AllowExecution

AlreadySet

!IllegalHmacList &
HmacIsAMatch

AllowExecution'

AlreadySet'

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0

1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

3.5.4 Setting the XN Bit
The final part of Code White comes in the ProcessLoaded() stage of the loading
process. Here, as the loader creates the new process’ code chunk, it sets the appropriate
page table permissions before mapping the code.

This is done in the

DProcess::MapUserRamCode function. This function does a number of tasks to ensure it
has the correct permissions for the chunk type. The modified function checks the global
AllowExecution flag. If it is set to 1, it does nothing else. If the flag is 0, it replaces the
chosen permissions with 0xA1F. Bit 0, the XN bit is shown in Figure 6. (Note the
Multiple Memory model uses small pages by default.)

Figure 6 - Symbian Page Table Entry Format
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The permissions 0xA1F indicate the chunk is neither shared nor global, and that
the supervisor may read the chunk while user has no access. The untrusted code is
secured, unavailable for instruction fetching, but is available for analysis if desired.
3.5.5 Limitations
The Code White implementation includes a number of limitations, either by
design to manage the scope of the effort, or as a result of difficulties encountered in its
creation. Code White protects a smartphone against untrusted user applications (.exe)
and any associated, untrusted, statically linked libraries (.dll). It does not protect against
the various other types of executable files that run on the Symbian/ARM system
including drivers and locales. It does not protect against untrusted or malicious files that
execute from the ROM. It is assumed these files are verified and trusted. Furthermore, if
these files are compromised, then there is not a basis for trusting Code White itself. An
attacker that can access the files before ROM creation is assumed to have a persistant
presence on the device; no protection mechanism can successfully provide trust for such
a device.
The next limitation is the requirement to create two extra copies of the code
section. Ideally, the executive function E32Loader::CodeCheck should be able to read
any user memory space, including the allocated space for the loading process’ code. But
in practice, this was not achieved, even using the Symbian built Kern::AccessCode()
function which places a mutex on the code segment to allow access. Reading a copy to
the user heap and later copying it to the kernel heap is a workaround, and affects Code
White’s performance. Even if this were not an issue, the call to check the code would
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remain in the E32Image::Read function since at that point the newly read code section
has not been relocated. Performing the code check after relocation is not feasible since
modified pointers throughout the code would change its HMAC resulting in a miss while
searching the hmacs.txt file.
To simplify Code White’s design, support was removed for compressed images.
Standard Symbian supports three types of file compression: the Huffman Deflate
algorithm, the bytepair compression algorithm and no compression.

A small

modification to the E32Image::Construct function checks the compression type and
returns KErrNotSupported if the file is compressed. Adding support for compressed files
would be simple if the ability to access user code from the CodeCheck executive function
is added. The call to CodeCheck would only need to be invoked between the time the
code section is uncompressed and the time that it is relocated.
Another improvement would be to load the HMACs file only once. Currently it is
loaded each time a code section loads to RAM. Allocating a persistent area in the
kernel’s memory would provide a modest performance gain.

3.6 Conclusion
With a brief introduction to both the Symbian Operating System and the ARM
Architecture, this chapter presents Code White, a signed code mechanism to promote
trusted execution of third party applications. It should have minimal impact on device
performance. Since reading extra copies of the code and computing their respective
HMACs while loading requires additional time, it will take longer to load than a standard
build of the same OS, most likely adding an overhead of 50%-200%. However any
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decrease in performance is expected to be suffered only at load time, and will not affect
the steady state operation of the trusted applications.
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IV. Code White Performance
4.1 Approach
To measurably achieve the goal of improving smartphone security, it is necessary
to execute Code White and evaluate its ability to prevent the execution of untrusted code
while minimizing processing overhead. The methodology to determine this consists of
two rounds of testing: one to evaluate the protection mechanism, the other to detect any
change in performance compared to an unmodified system. Each system attempts to
execute approved and unapproved code to verify expected operation. A small group of
applications serve as the trusted set for Code White’s HMAC table while several others
are the untrusted input.
To illustrate successful protection it is expected that Code White will allow all
trusted applications (.exe) and their statically loaded libraries (.dll) to load and execute, as
long as both the HMACs of the application and all libraries are in the Code White
hmacs.txt file. Further, Code White will not execute any combination of .exe/.dll files
that includes an untrusted file.
It is expected that Code White will add significant overhead to the loading
process compared to an unmodified system and that this overhead will grow linearly as
the number of libraries and the code size increases.

41

4.2 System Under Test
The system under test (SUT) is the smartphone application protection system,
shown in Figure 7. Though the system interacts with other entities, (user, network, etc.)
the system is limited to the handheld device itself.

Figure 7 - Smartphone Application Protection System

The system includes four components. The loader loads executable files and
performs other functions to ensure system security during and after the loading process.
Code White’s implementation within the loader makes it the component under test. The
user interface provides some security by validating user input. The memory management
system applies security policies to protect code and data in main memory. Finally, the
file system includes many protections for offline files in the device. These components
provide two services, system and data security. Table 6 shows various outcomes that
result from these services.

42

Table 6 - Protection System Services and Outcomes

Service
System Security
Data Security

Outcome
Untrusted code: Executed, Blocked
System settings: Correct, Incorrect
Malformed input: Allowed, Blocked
Data protected, Data compromised (unauthorized access)

To measure Code White’s successful operation and performance requires two
metrics. First, the handling of trusted/untrusted files yields a Boolean result - either the
subject application executes or it does not. Second, the response time for each loading
application serves as the performance indicator. Both the standard Symbian platform and
the modified version contain a timer to provide this metric.

4.3 System Parameters, Factors & Workload
The SUT includes four fixed parameters for the testing procedure: hardware, the
OS base version, the security key, and the application whitelist. The hardware is virtual,
emulated by the Symbian-modified Quick Emulator (QEMU) known as the ‘Syborg
Virtual Platform’ (hereafter ‘syborg’). Syborg emulates an ARM Cortex-A8 processor
and 128 MB of RAM. The Cortex-A8 supports the multiple memory model and thus the
XN bit required for Code White. Though Code White’s design is centered around the
hardware XN bit, it is a software modification. The hardware configuration is the same
for all tests.
The base OS version in both the standard and modified images is Symbian 3.0.h.
Keeping the same base ensures that only the Code White modification affects the
performance metrics.
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The secure key used to calculate the HMACs in Code White could affect
performance if its length is varied between tests. The key for all tests is 32 bytes:
‘123456789012345678901234567890AB’.
The length of the HMAC whitelist file is fixed since a longer file requires longer
searches to find a valid HMAC or determine that the application is untrusted. The
whitelist for the tests contains only the HMACs of the fifteen trusted files (identified
below).
Code checking is a system testing factor. Either Code White is present or not.
Meanwhile, the workload consists of the applications presented to the system along with
their associated libraries. The size of the application code, number of dlls, and trust level
of the files are workload factors.
The .exe file sizes range across four values: 1, 10, 50 and 100kB, represented by
s, m, l and x respectively in the first character of the file name. Each has a number of
dependencies (dlls) from none to two as shown in Table 7, columns labeled 0, 1 and 2.
Table 7 - Workload Executables
Size/Dlls
1kB
10kB
50kB
100kB

0
s0.exe
m0.exe
l0.exe
x0.exe

1
s1.exe
m1.exe
l1.exe
x1.exe

2
s11.exe
m11.exe
l11.exe
x11.exe

The workload also includes three libraries: d1.dll, d2.dll and d3.dll. All three are
~1kB in size.

The three applications named _11.exe explicitly include d1.dll and

implicitly include d2.dll. In other words, d1 has a dependency on d2. The three _1.exe
files include only d3.
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The untrusted executable files are duplicates of the trusted versions that have a
few bytes changed in their text sections. All of the executables print a few messages to
the console, so the simplest change to make is to change the message. For instance,
“press any key” is changed to “break any key”. This keeps the file and section sizes the
same, and does not require any change to the file headers. Both .exe and .dll files have
trusted and untrusted versions. Since untrusted files never execute, they are not used for
performance testing, but only to validate the protection mechanism.
Table 8 shows the four experimental factors and their levels used in both test
groups. Code checking is fixed ‘on’ for testing protection since all files are expected to
execute on standard Symbian, which was verified before running the protection tests.
File trust level is ‘trusted’ for all files used in the performance test as the loading
performance of an untrusted application that will fail to execute is not important to the
user experience. In all cases of failed execution caused by Code White blocking an
untrusted file, an error message was returned to the user who could subsequently type
another command into the console. This is acceptable for the case of a blocked file.
Table 8 - Experimental Factor Levels
Factor
Code Checking
File Size (kB)
Number of dlls
File Trust Level

Levels
On/Off
1, 10, 50, 100
0, 1, 2
Trusted, Untrusted

Protection Testing
Fixed (On)
Varied
Varied
Varied

Performance Testing
Varied
Varied
Varied
Fixed (Trusted)

With these levels, protection testing includes 56 experiments, the result of
multiplying 4 file sizes by the sum of 2 raised to the total number of files required for
each application, since all combinations of trusted/untrusted files are tested for execution
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success. Thus 8 tests for all combinations with no dlls, 16 for all combinations with 1 dll
and 32 for all combinations with 2 dlls yields the 56 tests.
Performance testing requires 72 tests, due to varying the 2 code checking levels, 4
file sizes and 3 dll levels. All tests are repeated 3 times.

4.4 Evaluation Technique and Experimental Design
To measure the response time, both the modified and standard systems include
two TTime objects in the RProcess::Create function. RProcess::Create invokes the loader
itself which contains Code White.

When it returns, the newly loaded application

executes. Thus, this function captures the start and stop objects for calculating the
application response time. The addition of the TTime object with its start and stop
instructions is the only modification to the standard Symbian platform.
To calculate the response time, a start object and stop object each set themselves
to the system time.

The objects themselves support a resolution of microseconds.

However, the Syborg platform only offers a usable precision of 1 millisecond. Because
of such a low resolution, and since the emulator does not emulate any of a smartphone’s
communications functions (network overhead, voice calls, SMS, etc), the expected
variance is extremely small.
The host machine running Syborg is an Intel Xeon 5160 quad core desktop (3.0
GHz) with 3.25GB RAM. The host OS is Windows XP SP3.
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4.5 Protection Testing
Table 9 - Protection Experimental Results
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

.exe
s0
s0
m0
m0
l0
l0
x0
x0
s1
s1
s1
s1
m1
m1
m1
m1
l1
l1
l1
l1
x1
x1
x1
x1
s11
s11
s11
s11

.dll

.dll

d3
d3
d3
d3
d3
d3
d3
d3
d3
d3
d3
d3
d3
d3
d3
d3
d1
d1
d1
d1

d2
d2
d2
d2

Loads?
yes
no
yes
no
yes
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no

Test
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

.exe
s11
s11
s11
s11
m11
m11
m11
m11
m11
m11
m11
m11
l11
l11
l11
l11
l11
l11
l11
l11
x11
x11
x11
x11
x11
x11
x11
x11

.dll
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1
d1

.dll
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2
d2

Loads?
no
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
no

*Grey files are untrusted

Table 9 shows the results of the 56 tests to validate the efficacy of the protection
mechanism. White cells represent trusted files, while untrusted files are shown in grey.
For each run, the S:\sys\bin directory only contains the files for that test to ensure the
correct combinations executed.

Only tests that include all white cells loaded and
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executed which is the desired response. Thus, Code White successfully allows trusted
code to execute and prevents untrusted code.

4.6 Performance Testing
The results of the 72 performance tests are shown in Appendix A. Figure 8 is a
difference plot of the mean load times for an application with no .dlls loading on both
Symbian and Code White.

App Load Time Difference: Std Symbian vs Code White, 0 Dlls

Difference of Mean Load Times (msec)

Diff = 2.756 + 0.2814 Size

35

Regression
95% CI

30

S
R-Sq
R-Sq(adj)

25

0.299817
100.0%
99.9%

20
15
10
5
0
0

20

40
60
File Size (kB)

80

100

Figure 8 - Difference In Application Load Times

As expected, the difference in mean load times is linear as both systems show a
linear increase in load time in response to increasing file size. Likewise, increasing the
number of .dlls produces a similar response, linear according to the size of the .dlls being
loaded as shown in Figure 9.
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Application Load Time in Code White by Number of Dlls
110

Dlls
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2

100

Load Time (msec)
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60
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Figure 9 - Application Load Time in Code White by Number of Dlls

The regression model for Code White’s load time performance is
Load Time = 25.8 + 0.540 * Size + 13.5 * Dlls

(1)

where ‘Size’ is the sum of the .exe and all associated .dll code section sizes and ‘Dlls’ is
the number of .dll files included. The sum of squares given by an analysis of variance
test yields 20,443 as the regression sum of squares and 52 for that of the residual error.
The P value for the regression is less than .001 which gives convincing evidence that the
the regression model fits the data well.
Based on (1) an application with a 1MB code section and no dlls would load in
566 milliseconds using Code White (95% prediction interval 555 to 577 msec) while one
with two dlls would take 593 milliseconds (95% interval 582 to 604 msec). Both times
are less than the one second limit proposed as the most a user will maintain uninterrupted
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thought [Nie94].

While it is not fast enough for the user to feel the machine is

instantaneously responsive, it is practical enough for general use. Knowing the load time
of a one megabyte code section is important as many applications currently remain below
this limit. Meanwhile the 95% confidence interval for an unmodified Symbian image to
load the same applications puts the 1MB load time between 243 and 354 milliseconds.
Code White’s performance is therefore noticeably slower than the alternative (~133%
slower for 1MB with no dlls,) but it is still acceptable for the user.

4.7 Summary
Compared to a standard Symbian image running on QEMU, Code White incurs a
linearly increasing overhead based on the size of the executable code that is loaded. For
applications up to 1MB, the total load time is still within usable limits for the user.
Chapter 5 proposes several ways to improve Code White’s performance as well as related
work.
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V. Conclusion
5.1 Research Accomplishments
This research explores the emerging area of smartphones, their uses and
vulnerabilities, and the current and potential threats to them, mostly brought on by their
capability to execute arbitrary third party code. A signed code mechanism called Code
White was developed and implemented in a Symbian OS kernel running on QEMU. (A
diff output in Appendix B identifies the modifications made to the original Symbian
source code.) Code White’s performance while loading executable files was compared to
that of a standard Symbian system.
Smartphones can communicate over many different protocols and mediums, thus
offering many attack vectors for malicious actors. However, rather than seeking to
protect against these many diverse methods, Code White addresses and protects the
common capability malicious code cannot succeed without: the ability to execute.
Code White successfully prevents the execution of untrusted code while imposing
an acceptable increase in load time of 43 milliseconds for a 100kB file with 2 dlls, and a
predicted increase of 300 milliseconds for a 1MB file with 2 dlls (95% prediction
interval).

A user may use a phone running Code White without experiencing any

disruptions to their normal activities. Furthermore, resource usage is kept to a minimum.
A few extra milliseconds of loading are required of the CPU and batteries, which is much
less than that required by using antivirus. The ability to stop untrusted code meets the
research goal of improving security for smartphones.
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5.2 Research Significance
Realizing that there is a balance between security and usability, Code White may
not be a popular protection mechanism for the mass market of consumer smartphones.
Many choose to buy these phones based upon the capability to crawl through any number
of applications, trying and buying many of them. Such a use case is the antithesis of
Code White.

Certainly developers and vendors could provide HMACs of these

applications, but two limitations stand out: providing large HMAC lists will affect
performance, and worse, malicious coders have been able to receive valid signatures in
the application signing process. Creating a more robust signed code mechanism does
nothing to fill holes in the trust granting procedure.
However, there are many corporate and government areas that could benefit from
Code White. Many such organizations have policies that explicitly list what applications
may run on company or government equipment. These lists are generally short and
relatively static. Thus the HMAC lists would be short and infrequently used. Corporate
and government trust granting mechanisms are more capable and more highly motivated
to use closer scrutiny, and the distribution processes can be more carefully guarded than
that of the general consumer public.

5.3 Future Research
The Symbian Operating System was released as open source in early 2010.
Learning the inner workings of an unknown OS - even one for mobile devices - takes
time. Perfecting any modifications to that OS take even longer. There are a number of
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improvements that can be made to Code White and there is additional research that can
be done.
Code White makes three copies of the loading application’s code to get it to the
code checking executive function.

Fixing this need would greatly improve its

performance, possibly putting its performance very close to that of the unmodified OS.
This should be done with care to ensure the protection of the kernel while accessing user
code directly.
The hmacs.txt file used in testing only contained the fifteen HMACs that
represented the fifteen trusted files tested. The performance change resulting from the
HMAC list size could be determined by testing with a larger list. It is expected that any
increase in load time due to a larger list (hundreds of HMACs) would be small compared
to increasing the file size. If that is not the case, and a larger list adds significant
overhead to the load time, the list could be sorted, and Code White could be modified
with a more efficient search algorithm to lower the search time.
This research implemented Code White in an emulated environment (QEMU).
One limitation of this was the timers that measured performance were also emulated and
had a very low precision. Implementation on a hardware device will result in more
precise results.

Testing on an actual smartphone while it executes its many other

capabilities including network interaction with voice and data connections running would
be very valuable.
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There are other types of executable files that are not currently checked by Code
White, including drivers and locales. Some of them are loaded directly into the kernel.
While checking their HMAC is trivial, additional study is required to determine how best
to isolate them if they are found to be untrusted.
Code White could be used to detect and capture malicious code for mobile
devices. A number of smartphones or emulated phones could be scripted to browse
mobile web sites, and devices could be placed in high traffic areas, with the purpose of
being a ‘victim’ of malicious code. For high traffic areas, devices could make themselves
discoverable in as many modes as possible, to see if connection attempts are made and
any files are pushed to them.

Using the phones could gather files with

untrusted/unrecognized code sections as a type of early warning system for mobile
malware.
The Code White mechanism should also be tested on devices that are not typically
thought of as smartphones. For instance, devices like the General Dynamics GD300X
wearable computer is essentially a smartphone developed for ground troops to wear
[Cra10]. Such devices will certainly be targeted by adversaries.
Mobile phones are already an enabler in our military. Once frowned upon, they
are now even issued to commanders - not just phones that make and take calls, but
smartphones that can connect to other devices and run programs. The same is true of
business and civic leaders. Current trends show more business at these levels being done
using the computing power of these devices as opposed to the desktop computers in their
offices. Protecting these critical devices is as important as protecting other types of
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computing systems. While antivirus and similar protection methods are not up to the
task, Code White has shown a secure system can be provided with acceptable limits of
usability and resource usage.
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Appendix A. Performance Testing Data

s0
m0
l0
x0
s1
m1
l1
x1
s11
m11
l11
x11

Code White
Run1
Run2
25
25
31
32
52
52
81
81
41
41
46
45
65
65
94
94
54
55
58
58
78
77
107
107

s0
m0
l0
x0
s1
m1
l1
x1
s11
m11
l11
x11

Standard
Run1
22
27
36
52
33
34
43
60
38
43
50
66

Run2
21
25
35
49
32
34
44
58
39
41
51
64

Run3
25
31
52
81
41
46
65
94
54
60
77
107

Run3
22
26
35
49
32
34
43
57
39
40
50
64

Mean
25
31.33333
52
81
41
45.66667
65
94
54.33333
58.66667
77.33333
107

Mean
21.66667
26
35.33333
50
32.33333
34
43.33333
58.33333
38.66667
41.33333
50.33333
64.66667
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Appendix B. Code White and Symbian PDK 3.0.h Diff
diff -r 2ee5df201f60 kernel/eka/euser/us_ksvr.cpp
--- a/kernel/eka/euser/us_ksvr.cpp Mon Mar 08 11:58:34 2010 +0000
+++ b/kernel/eka/euser/us_ksvr.cpp Thu Aug 26 11:46:14 2010 -0400
@@ -4892,7 +4892,20 @@
RLoader loader;
TInt r=loader.Connect();
if (r==KErrNone)
+
{
+
TTime OrigTime;
+
OrigTime.HomeTime();//Start time for loading process
+
TTime timetwo;
+
TInt64 us;
+
TTimeIntervalMicroSeconds ttims;
+
r=loader.LoadProcess(iHandle,aFileName,aCommand,aUidType,aType);
+
+
timetwo.HomeTime();//End time for loading process
+
ttims=timetwo.MicroSecondsFrom(OrigTime);
+
us=ttims.Int64();
+
RDebug::Printf("%S loaded in %d
microseconds",&aFileName,us);
+
}
loader.Close();
return r;
}
diff -r 2ee5df201f60 kernel/eka/include/e32ldr_private.h
--- a/kernel/eka/include/e32ldr_private.h Mon Mar 08 11:58:34 2010
+0000
+++ b/kernel/eka/include/e32ldr_private.h Thu Aug 26 11:46:14 2010 0400
@@ -308,6 +308,15 @@
TInt64 iStartAddress;
TInt iDriveNumber;
};
+
+class TCodeInfo //Class exclusive to Code White
+
{
+public:
+
TInt iSize; //size of code section
+
TUint8* iCLA; //pointer to user heap buffer holding code section
+
TInt iHLSize; //size of hmac whitelist
+
TUint8*
iHmacList; //pointer to user heap buffer holding hmac
whitelist
+
};
//
// Loader magic executive functions
@@ -333,7 +342,7 @@
IMPORT_C static TAny* ThreadProcessCodeSeg(TInt aHandle);
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IMPORT_C static void ReadExportDir(TAny* aHandle, TUint32*
aDest);
IMPORT_C static TInt LocaleExports(TAny* aHandle,
TLibraryFunction* aExportsList);
+
IMPORT_C static TInt CodeCheck(TProcessCreateInfo& aInfo,
TCodeInfo* aCodeInfo);
#ifdef __MARM__
IMPORT_C static void GetV7StubAddresses(TLinAddr& aExe, TLinAddr&
aDll);
static TInt V7ExeEntryStub();
diff -r 2ee5df201f60 kernel/eka/kernel/execs.txt
--- a/kernel/eka/kernel/execs.txt
Mon Mar 08 11:58:34 2010 +0000
+++ b/kernel/eka/kernel/execs.txt
Thu Aug 26 11:46:14 2010 -0400
@@ -2437,6 +2437,16 @@
arg1 = TDes8&
}
+slow
+
+
+
+
+
+
+}
+
+

{
name =
user =
export
return
arg1 =
arg2 =

CodeCheck
E32Loader
= TInt
TProcessCreateInfo&
TCodeInfo*

/**********************************************************************
********
* End of normal executive functions
diff -r 2ee5df201f60 kernel/eka/kernel/scodeseg.cpp
--- a/kernel/eka/kernel/scodeseg.cpp
Mon Mar 08 11:58:34 2010
+0000
+++ b/kernel/eka/kernel/scodeseg.cpp
Thu Aug 26 11:46:14 2010 0400
@@ -19,6 +19,370 @@
#include <e32uid.h>
#include "execs.h"
+/* GLOBAL.H - RSAREF types and constants (added for Code White)
+ */
+
+/* PROTOTYPES should be set to one if and only if the compiler
supports
+ function argument prototyping.
+The following makes PROTOTYPES default to 0 if it has not already
+ been defined with C compiler flags.
+ */
+#ifndef PROTOTYPES
+#define PROTOTYPES 0
+#endif
+
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+/* POINTER defines a generic pointer type */
+typedef unsigned char *POINTER;
+
+//#if 1
+/* UINT2 defines a two byte word */
+typedef unsigned short int UINT2;
+
+/* UINT4 defines a four byte word */
+typedef unsigned long int UINT4;
+
+typedef struct {
+ UINT4 state[4];
/* state (ABCD) */
+ UINT4 count[2];
/* number of bits, modulo 2^64 (lsb first) */
+ unsigned char buffer[64];
/* input buffer */
+} MD5_CTX;
+
+void MD5Transform (UINT4 state[], unsigned char block[]);
+void Encode(unsigned char *output, UINT4 *input, unsigned int len);
+void MD5Init (MD5_CTX *context);
+void MD5Final (unsigned char digest[], MD5_CTX *context);
+void MD5Update (MD5_CTX *context, unsigned char *input, unsigned int
inputLen);
+void Decode (UINT4 *output,unsigned char *input,unsigned int len);
+
+/* PROTO_LIST is defined depending on how PROTOTYPES is defined above.
+If using PROTOTYPES, then PROTO_LIST returns the list, otherwise it
+ returns an empty list.
+ */
+#if PROTOTYPES
+#define PROTO_LIST(list) list
+#else
+#define PROTO_LIST(list) ()
+#endif
+
+/* MD5.H - header file for MD5C.C
+ */
+
+/* Copyright (C) 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1991. All
+rights reserved.
+
+License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it
+is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest
+Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software
+or this function.
+
+License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided
+that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Data
+Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm" in all material
+mentioning or referencing the derived work.
+
+RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either
+the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this
+software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is"
+without express or implied warranty of any kind.
+These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this
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+documentation and/or software.
+ */
+
+//static char rcsid[] = "$Id: md5c.c,v 1.2 1999/08/25 21:45:14 lennox
Exp $";
+
+/* Constants for MD5Transform routine.
+ */
+
+#define S11 7
+#define S12 12
+#define S13 17
+#define S14 22
+#define S21 5
+#define S22 9
+#define S23 14
+#define S24 20
+#define S31 4
+#define S32 11
+#define S33 16
+#define S34 23
+#define S41 6
+#define S42 10
+#define S43 15
+#define S44 21
+
+static unsigned char PADDING[64] = {
+ 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+};
+
+/* F, G, H and I are basic MD5 functions.
+ */
+#define F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~x) & (z)))
+#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (~z)))
+#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
+#define I(x, y, z) ((y) ^ ((x) | (~z)))
+
+/* ROTATE_LEFT rotates x left n bits.
+ */
+#define ROTATE_LEFT(x, n) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n))))
+
+/* FF, GG, HH, and II transformations for rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4.
+Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation.
+ */
+#define FF(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
+ (a) += F ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
+ (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
+ (a) += (b); \
+ }
+#define GG(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
+ (a) += G ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
+ (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
+ (a) += (b); \
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+ }
+#define HH(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
+ (a) += H ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
+ (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
+ (a) += (b); \
+ }
+#define II(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
+ (a) += I ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
+ (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
+ (a) += (b); \
+ }
+
+/* MD5 initialization. Begins an MD5 operation, writing a new context.
+ */
+void MD5Init (MD5_CTX *context)
+
/* context */
+{
+ context->count[0] = context->count[1] = 0;
+ /* Load magic initialization constants.
+*/
+ context->state[0] = 0x67452301;
+ context->state[1] = 0xefcdab89;
+ context->state[2] = 0x98badcfe;
+ context->state[3] = 0x10325476;
+}
+
+/* MD5 block update operation. Continues an MD5 message-digest
+ operation, processing another message block, and updating the
+ context.
+ */
+void MD5Update (MD5_CTX *context, unsigned char *input, unsigned int
inputLen)
+{
+ unsigned int i, index, partLen;
+
+ /* Compute number of bytes mod 64 */
+ index = (unsigned int)((context->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3F);
+
+ /* Update number of bits */
+ if ((context->count[0] += ((UINT4)inputLen << 3)) < ((UINT4)inputLen
<< 3))
+
context->count[1]++;
+ context->count[1] += ((UINT4)inputLen >> 29);
+
+ partLen = 64 - index;
+
+ /* Transform as many times as possible. */
+ if (inputLen >= partLen) {
+
memcpy((TAny*)&context->buffer[index], (const TAny*)input,
(TInt)partLen);
+
MD5Transform (context->state, context->buffer);
+
+
for (i = partLen; i + 63 < inputLen; i += 64)
+
MD5Transform (context->state, &input[i]);
+
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+
index = 0;
+ }
+ else
+
i = 0;
+
+ /* Buffer remaining input */
+ /* fixed by Akira Tsukamoto 04/04/2002 */
+ if (i >= inputLen)
+
return;
+ /* end fix */
+ memcpy
+
((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (POINTER)&input[i],
+
inputLen-i);
+}
+
+/* MD5 finalization. Ends an MD5 message-digest operation, writing the
+ the message digest and zeroizing the context.
+ */
+void MD5Final (unsigned char digest[], MD5_CTX *context)/* context */
+{
+ unsigned char bits[8];
+ unsigned int index, padLen;
+
+ /* Save number of bits */
+ Encode (bits, context->count, 8);
+
+ /* Pad out to 56 mod 64. */
+ index = (unsigned int)((context->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3f);
+ padLen = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : (120 - index);
+ MD5Update (context, PADDING, padLen);
+
+ /* Append length (before padding) */
+ MD5Update (context, bits, 8);
+
+
+ /* Store state in digest */
+ Encode (digest, context->state, 16);
+
+ /* Zeroize sensitive information. */
+ memset ((POINTER)context, 0, sizeof (*context));
+} /* MD5final */
+
+
+/* MD5 basic transformation. Transforms state based on block.
+ */
+void MD5Transform (UINT4 state[], unsigned char block[])
+{
+ UINT4 a = state[0], b = state[1], c = state[2], d = state[3], x[16];
+
+ Decode (x, block, 64);
+
+ /* Round 1 */
+ FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 0], S11, 0xd76aa478); /* 1 */
+ FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 1], S12, 0xe8c7b756); /* 2 */
+ FF (c, d, a, b, x[ 2], S13, 0x242070db); /* 3 */
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+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF

(b,
(a,
(d,
(c,
(b,
(a,
(d,
(c,
(b,
(a,
(d,
(c,
(b,

c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,

d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,

a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,
d,
c,
b,
a,

x[ 3],
x[ 4],
x[ 5],
x[ 6],
x[ 7],
x[ 8],
x[ 9],
x[10],
x[11],
x[12],
x[13],
x[14],
x[15],

S14,
S11,
S12,
S13,
S14,
S11,
S12,
S13,
S14,
S11,
S12,
S13,
S14,

0xc1bdceee);
0xf57c0faf);
0x4787c62a);
0xa8304613);
0xfd469501);
0x698098d8);
0x8b44f7af);
0xffff5bb1);
0x895cd7be);
0x6b901122);
0xfd987193);
0xa679438e);
0x49b40821);

/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*

4 */
5 */
6 */
7 */
8 */
9 */
10 */
11 */
12 */
13 */
14 */
15 */
16 */

/*
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG

Round 2 */
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,

x[ 1],
x[ 6],
x[11],
x[ 0],
x[ 5],
x[10],
x[15],
x[ 4],
x[ 9],
x[14],
x[ 3],
x[ 8],
x[13],
x[ 2],
x[ 7],
x[12],

S21,
S22,
S23,
S24,
S21,
S22,
S23,
S24,
S21,
S22,
S23,
S24,
S21,
S22,
S23,
S24,

0xf61e2562);
0xc040b340);
0x265e5a51);
0xe9b6c7aa);
0xd62f105d);
0x2441453);
0xd8a1e681);
0xe7d3fbc8);
0x21e1cde6);
0xc33707d6);
0xf4d50d87);
0x455a14ed);
0xa9e3e905);
0xfcefa3f8);
0x676f02d9);
0x8d2a4c8a);

/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/

/*
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH
HH

Round 3 */
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,

x[ 5],
x[ 8],
x[11],
x[14],
x[ 1],
x[ 4],
x[ 7],
x[10],
x[13],
x[ 0],
x[ 3],
x[ 6],
x[ 9],
x[12],
x[15],
x[ 2],

S31,
S32,
S33,
S34,
S31,
S32,
S33,
S34,
S31,
S32,
S33,
S34,
S31,
S32,
S33,
S34,

0xfffa3942);
0x8771f681);
0x6d9d6122);
0xfde5380c);
0xa4beea44);
0x4bdecfa9);
0xf6bb4b60);
0xbebfbc70);
0x289b7ec6);
0xeaa127fa);
0xd4ef3085);
0x4881d05);
0xd9d4d039);
0xe6db99e5);
0x1fa27cf8);
0xc4ac5665);

/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*
/*

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/

/*
II
II
II
II

Round 4 */
(a, b, c, d,
(d, a, b, c,
(c, d, a, b,
(b, c, d, a,

x[ 0],
x[ 7],
x[14],
x[ 5],

S41,
S42,
S43,
S44,

0xf4292244);
0x432aff97);
0xab9423a7);
0xfc93a039);

/*
/*
/*
/*

49
50
51
52

*/
*/
*/
*/
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+ II (a, b, c, d, x[12], S41, 0x655b59c3); /* 53 */
+ II (d, a, b, c, x[ 3], S42, 0x8f0ccc92); /* 54 */
+ II (c, d, a, b, x[10], S43, 0xffeff47d); /* 55 */
+ II (b, c, d, a, x[ 1], S44, 0x85845dd1); /* 56 */
+ II (a, b, c, d, x[ 8], S41, 0x6fa87e4f); /* 57 */
+ II (d, a, b, c, x[15], S42, 0xfe2ce6e0); /* 58 */
+ II (c, d, a, b, x[ 6], S43, 0xa3014314); /* 59 */
+ II (b, c, d, a, x[13], S44, 0x4e0811a1); /* 60 */
+ II (a, b, c, d, x[ 4], S41, 0xf7537e82); /* 61 */
+ II (d, a, b, c, x[11], S42, 0xbd3af235); /* 62 */
+ II (c, d, a, b, x[ 2], S43, 0x2ad7d2bb); /* 63 */
+ II (b, c, d, a, x[ 9], S44, 0xeb86d391); /* 64 */
+
+ state[0] += a;
+ state[1] += b;
+ state[2] += c;
+ state[3] += d;
+
+ /* Zeroize sensitive information. */
+ memset ((POINTER)x, 0, sizeof (x));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encodes input (UINT4) into output (unsigned char). Assumes len is
+ * a multiple of 4.
+ */
+void Encode(unsigned char *output, UINT4 *input, unsigned int len)
+{
+ unsigned int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; j < len; i++, j += 4) {
+ output[j] = (unsigned char)(input[i] & 0xff);
+ output[j+1] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 8) & 0xff);
+ output[j+2] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 16) & 0xff);
+ output[j+3] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 24) & 0xff);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decodes input (unsigned char) into output (UINT4). Assumes len is
+ * a multiple of 4.
+ */
+void Decode (
+UINT4 *output,
+unsigned char *input,
+unsigned int len)
+{
+ unsigned int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; j < len; i++, j += 4)
+ output[i] = ((UINT4)input[j]) | (((UINT4)input[j+1]) << 8) |
+
(((UINT4)input[j+2]) << 16) | (((UINT4)input[j+3]) << 24);
+}
+
+/* RFC 2202 HMAC-MD5 */
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+
+#define MD5_DIGESTSIZE 16
+#define MD5_BLOCKSIZE
64
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/* RFC 2202 HMAC-MD5 */
+
+void truncate
+(
+unsigned char*
d1,
/* data to be truncated */
+unsigned char*
d2,
/* truncated data */
+int
len
/* length in bytes to keep */
+)
+{
+
int
i ;
+
for (i = 0 ; i < len ; i++) d2[i] = d1[i];
+}
+
+
extern void InvalidExecHandler();
// Compare code segments by name
@@ -1790,6 +2154,183 @@
return r;
}
+
+/** Code White - Checks to see if loading code is trusted.
+
+
Capt Joe Hinson, Air Force Institute of Technology, July 2010
+
+
Calculates HMAC of loading code section and searches for the HMAC
in a file
+
of trusted HMACs (hmacs.txt). The HMAC of the hmacs.txt file is
also
+
calculated and checked against its known HMAC. Based on the
outcome of the
+
two comparisons, the global flag 'AllowExecution' is set to
signal whether
+
the process will be allowed to execute (done during
E32Loader::ProcessLoaded).
+
+
@param
aInfo
Information about the loading process.
+
@param
aCodeInfo
Information about the buffers containing
the code section
+
and HMAC list that are to be
checked.
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+
aCodeInfo.iCLA - address of user
heap buffer containing code
+
aCodeInfo.iSize - size of loading
code section
+
aCodeInfo.iHmacList - addr of user
heap buffer containing list
+
aCodeInfo.iHLSize - size of hmac
list
+
+ */
+TInt ExecHandler::CodeCheck(TProcessCreateInfo& aInfo, TCodeInfo*
aCodeInfo)
+
{
+
K::CheckFileServerAccess();
// only F32 can use
this exec function
+
TInt IllegalHmacList=0;
+
TInt HmacIsAMatch=0;
+
TProcessCreateInfo info;
+
kumemget32(&info, &aInfo, sizeof(info));
+
TCodeInfo CInfo;
+
kumemget32(&CInfo, aCodeInfo, sizeof(CInfo));
+
+
Kern::Printf("%S", &info.iFileName);
+
+
//Create Heap buffer for code section
+
NKern::ThreadEnterCS();
+
TUint8* HashBlock=new TUint8[CInfo.iSize];
+
NKern::ThreadLeaveCS();
+
if (!HashBlock)
+
return KErrNoMemory;
+
//Use kumemget to move code from user heap to kernel heap
+
kumemget(HashBlock, CInfo.iCLA, CInfo.iSize);
+
+
+
+
//Create Heap buffer for hmacs list
+
NKern::ThreadEnterCS();
+
TUint8* HmacsList=new TUint8[CInfo.iHLSize];
+
NKern::ThreadLeaveCS();
+
if (!HashBlock)
+
return KErrNoMemory;
+
//Use kumemget to move code from user heap to kernel heap
+
kumemget(HmacsList, CInfo.iHmacList, CInfo.iHLSize);
+
+
//Print proof of successful copy if needed
+
//TPtr8 HLptr(HashBlock, 20, 20);
+
//TBuf8<20> printbuf;
+
//printbuf.Copy(HLptr);
+
//Kern::Printf("Buf is %S",&printbuf);
+
_LIT8(KHmacListHmac,
"\x07\x44\xD8\xC6\x32\x1B\x44\x34\x74\x65\x89\x66\x34\x51\xB7\x4E");//h
mac of hmacs.txt
+
+
TPtrC8 HLH(KHmacListHmac);
+
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+
unsigned char g_key[] = "123456789012345678901234567890AB";
+
unsigned char codehmac[MD5_DIGESTSIZE];
+
unsigned char listhmac[MD5_DIGESTSIZE];
+
char* k = (char*)g_key;
+
int lk = 32;
+
int t = MD5_DIGESTSIZE;
+
char* d = (char*)HmacsList; //pointer to list of HMACs
+
int ld = CInfo.iHLSize;
//size of the list
+
char* out = (char*)listhmac; //will hold the list's computed HMAC
+
TInt n;
+
+
//compute hmacs
+
for (n=0; n<2; n++) //compute hmac of hash list when n=0
+
{
+
+
if (n) //compute hmac of code section when n=1
+
{
+
d = (char*)HashBlock; //location of the code to be
hashed
+
ld = CInfo.iSize; //size of the code
+
out = (char*)codehmac; //will hold the code's
computed hmac
+
}
+
+
MD5_CTX ictx, octx ;
+
unsigned char
imd5[MD5_DIGESTSIZE], omd5[MD5_DIGESTSIZE]
;
+
unsigned char
key[MD5_DIGESTSIZE] ;
+
unsigned char
buf[MD5_BLOCKSIZE] ;
+
int
i ;
+
+
if (lk > MD5_BLOCKSIZE) {
+
+
MD5_CTX
tctx ;
+
+
MD5Init(&tctx) ;
+
MD5Update(&tctx, (unsigned char*)k, lk) ;
+
MD5Final(key, &tctx) ;
+
+
k = (char*)key ;
+
lk = MD5_DIGESTSIZE ;
+
}
+
+
/**** Inner Digest ****/
+
+
MD5Init(&ictx);
+
+
/* Pad the key for inner digest */
+
for (i = 0 ; i < lk ; ++i) buf[i] = k[i] ^ 0x36 ;
+
for (i = lk ; i < MD5_BLOCKSIZE ; ++i) buf[i] = 0x36 ;
+
+
MD5Update(&ictx, buf, MD5_BLOCKSIZE) ;
+
MD5Update(&ictx, (unsigned char*)d, ld) ;
+
+
MD5Final(imd5, &ictx) ;
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+
+
/**** Outter Digest ****/
+
+
MD5Init(&octx) ;
+
+
/* Pad the key for outter digest */
+
+
for (i = 0 ; i < lk ; ++i) buf[i] = k[i] ^ 0x5C ;
+
for (i = lk ; i < MD5_BLOCKSIZE ; ++i) buf[i] = 0x5C ;
+
+
MD5Update(&octx, buf, MD5_BLOCKSIZE) ;
+
MD5Update(&octx, imd5, MD5_DIGESTSIZE) ;
+
+
MD5Final(omd5, &octx) ;
+
+
/* truncate and print the results */
+
t = t > MD5_DIGESTSIZE ? MD5_DIGESTSIZE : t ;
+
truncate(omd5, (unsigned char*)out, t) ;
+
+
if (!n)
+
{
+
TPtr8 hlhptr(listhmac,MD5_DIGESTSIZE,
MD5_DIGESTSIZE);
+
IllegalHmacList=hlhptr.Compare(HLH);
+
//Kern::Printf("IllegalHmacList=%d",
IllegalHmacList);
+
}
+
+
}
+
TPtrC8 codehmacptr(codehmac, MD5_DIGESTSIZE); //pointer to hmac
of the code
+
TPtrC8 listptr(HmacsList, CInfo.iHLSize); //pointer to the list
+
TPtrC8 listhmacptr(listhmac, MD5_DIGESTSIZE);
+
TInt r=listptr.Find(codehmacptr);
+
if (r!=KErrNotFound)
+
HmacIsAMatch=1;
+
+
//print code hmac if needed
+
//TBuf8<MD5_DIGESTSIZE> hmacbuf;
+
//hmacbuf.Copy(codehmacptr);
+
//Kern::Printf("code hmac = %S",&hmacbuf);
+
//TBuf8<MD5_DIGESTSIZE> listbuf;
+
//listbuf.Copy(listhmacptr);
+
//Kern::Printf("list hmac = %S",&listbuf);
+
+
//clean up the heap
+
NKern::ThreadEnterCS();
+
delete[] HashBlock;
+
NKern::ThreadLeaveCS();
+
+
NKern::ThreadEnterCS();
+
delete[] HmacsList;
+
NKern::ThreadLeaveCS();
+
+
extern TUint AllowExecution;
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+
extern TUint HasBeenSet;
+
Kern::Printf("IllegalHmacList=%d HmacIsAMatch=%d
AllowExecution=%d HasBeenSet=%d", IllegalHmacList, HmacIsAMatch,
AllowExecution, HasBeenSet);
+
if (IllegalHmacList!=0 || HmacIsAMatch!=1)
+
AllowExecution=0;
+
if (IllegalHmacList==0 && HmacIsAMatch==1 && HasBeenSet==0)
+
AllowExecution=1;
+
Kern::Printf("IllegalHmacList=%d HmacIsAMatch=%d
AllowExecution=%d HasBeenSet=%d", IllegalHmacList, HmacIsAMatch,
AllowExecution, HasBeenSet);
+
HasBeenSet=1;
+
+
return KErrNone;
+
}
+
TInt ExecHandler::ProcessLoaded(TProcessCreateInfo& aInfo)
{
TProcessCreateInfo info;
diff -r 2ee5df201f60 kernel/eka/kernel/sprocess.cpp
--- a/kernel/eka/kernel/sprocess.cpp
Mon Mar 08 11:58:34 2010
+0000
+++ b/kernel/eka/kernel/sprocess.cpp
Thu Aug 26 11:46:14 2010 0400
@@ -159,6 +159,12 @@
BTrace8(BTrace::EThreadPriority,BTrace::EProcessPriority,this,iPr
iority);
#endif
iId = K::NewId();
+
+
extern TUint AllowExecution; //Code White - Initialize
AllowExecution & HasBeenSet
+
extern TUint HasBeenSet;
+
AllowExecution=0;
+
HasBeenSet=0;
+
iCreatorId = iId; // Initialise as self for safety because
creator has special capabilities
if(TheSuperPage().KernelConfigFlags() &
EKernelConfigPlatSecProcessIsolation)
{
diff -r 2ee5df201f60 kernel/eka/memmodel/epoc/multiple/mprocess.cpp
--- a/kernel/eka/memmodel/epoc/multiple/mprocess.cpp Mon Mar 08
11:58:34 2010 +0000
+++ b/kernel/eka/memmodel/epoc/multiple/mprocess.cpp Thu Aug 26
11:46:14 2010 -0400
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
#include "cache_maintenance.h"
#include <demand_paging.h>
+TUint AllowExecution; //Code White global flags
+TUint HasBeenSet;
+
#define iMState
iWaitLink.iSpare1
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// just for convenience...
@@ -533,7 +536,17 @@
LOCK_USER_MEMORY();
}
}
if(r!=KErrNone)
+
if(!aLoading) //Code White - If in ProcessLoaded and not
trusted, set permissions to same as user data (includes XN bit)
+
{
+
if (!AllowExecution)
+
{
+
TPte perm=0x83f;
+
iCodeChunk->ApplyPermissions(offset, codeSize,
perm);
+
Kern::Printf("Execution disallowed for iId
%08x!", iId);
+
}
+
}
+
+
if(r!=KErrNone)
{
// error, so decommit up code pages we had already
committed...
DChunk::TDecommitType decommitType = paged ?
DChunk::EDecommitVirtual : DChunk::EDecommitNormal;
diff -r 2ee5df201f60 userlibandfileserver/fileserver/sfile/sf_lepoc.cpp
--- a/userlibandfileserver/fileserver/sfile/sf_lepoc.cpp
Mon Mar 08
11:58:34 2010 +0000
+++ b/userlibandfileserver/fileserver/sfile/sf_lepoc.cpp
Thu Aug 26
11:46:14 2010 -0400
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <e32uid.h>
#include <e32rom.h>
#include "sf_cache.h"
+#include <hal.h>
#include "sf_pgcompr.h"
@@ -1540,10 +1541,10 @@
iS = aFinder.iNew.iS;
// check if executable has already been loaded...
r = CheckAlreadyLoaded();
if(r!=KErrNone)
return r;
+
//r = CheckAlreadyLoaded();
+
//if(r!=KErrNone)
+
//
return r;
+
iAlreadyLoaded=0; //Code White - force all applications to load
from file - even if loading multiple instances
// if we are going to need to load it...
if(!iAlreadyLoaded || !iIsDll)
{
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@@ -1632,9 +1633,11 @@
__IF_DEBUG(Printf("%S is not marked SMP safe",
&iFileName));
iAttr &= ~ECodeSegAttSMPSafe;
}
+
if (iHeader->iCompressionType!=KFormatNotCompressed) //Code White
- only support uncompressed files
+
return KErrNotSupported;
// check if executable is to be demand paged...
r = ShouldBeCodePaged(iUseCodePaging);
+
//r = ShouldBeCodePaged(iUseCodePaging);
+
iUseCodePaging=EFalse;
__IF_DEBUG(Printf("ShouldBeCodePaged r=%d,iUseCodePaging=%d", r,
iUseCodePaging));
if(iUseCodePaging==EFalse || r!=KErrNone)
return r;
@@ -2076,6 +2079,59 @@
TInt r = iFile.Read(aPos,p,aSize);
if(r!=KErrNone)
return r;
+
+
//Code White - Read code section into heap buffer
+
//Create buffer and descripter to point to it
+
if (aPos==0x9C)
+
{
+
TUint8* codebuf=new TUint8[aSize];
+
TPtr8 codebufptr((TUint8*)codebuf,aSize,aSize);
+
+
//Read code section
+
iFile.Read(aPos, codebufptr, aSize);
+
+
//Print proof if needed
+
//TPtr8 bufprnt(codebuf,20, 20);
+
//RDebug::Printf("buf:%S",&bufprnt);
+
+
+
//Read Hmacs file into heap buffer pointed to by
codeInfo.iHmacList
+
RFs hfs;
+
hfs.Connect();
+
_LIT(KHmacsFile,"s:\\sys\\bin\\hmacs.txt");
+
RFile HmacsFile;
+
//open the hmac file
+
TInt h =
HmacsFile.Open(hfs,KHmacsFile,EFileShareExclusive|EFileRead);
+
if (h!=KErrNone)
+
{
+
RDebug::Printf("Couldn't open hmacs.txt - %d",
h);
+
return h;
+
}
+
TInt fsize;
+
HmacsFile.Size(fsize);
+
TUint8* hmacslist=new TUint8[fsize];
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+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

TPtr8 hmacsptr((TUint8*)hmacslist,fsize,fsize);
HmacsFile.Read(0, hmacsptr, fsize);
HmacsFile.Close();
hfs.Close();
//Prep codeInfo to pass to CodeCheck
TCodeInfo codeInfo;
codeInfo.iSize=iCodeSize;
codeInfo.iCLA=codebuf;//CodeForHmac;
codeInfo.iHmacList=hmacslist;
codeInfo.iHLSize=fsize;
TCodeInfo* CIPtr = &codeInfo;
//Call CodeCheck and pass the buck to kernel mode
TInt t=E32Loader::CodeCheck(*this, CIPtr);
if (t!=KErrNone)
return r;
delete[] codebuf;
delete[] hmacslist;
}
//end
}
// check we got the amount of data requested...
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